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The Legality of Extraterritorial Application of 
Competition Law and the Need to Adopt a Unified 
Approach  
Thanh Phan 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, three of the world’s largest shipping companies, Maersk Line, 
Mediterranean Shipping Company, and CMA CGM, planned to create a 
joint venture to operate a network named “P3 Network.”1 The proposed 
network would operate on three trade lanes: Asia-Europe, Trans-Pacific, 
and Trans-Atlantic.2 Although the headquarters of each company and the 
proposed joint venture were located outside Vietnamese territory, the three 
companies submitted a merger notification to the Vietnam Competition 
Authority (“VCA”), pursuant to article 20 of the Competition Law of 
Vietnam.3 The discussion surrounding this joint venture contributed to a 
long-standing debate in the VCA regarding the extraterritorial application 
of the Competition Law of Vietnam.4 The debate honed in on one primary 
issue: although the P3 Network was run by foreign-based companies 
located outside Vietnam, the companies still sought approval from the 
VCA. 
The extraterritorial application of competition law is a controversial 
issue not only in Vietnam, but also in other jurisdictions5—especially now, 
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 1. CMA CGM, Maersk Line and MSC to Establish an Operational Alliance, 
CMA CGM (June 18, 2013), https://www.cma-cgm.com/news/1/cma-cgm-maersk-
line-and-msc-to-establish-an-operational-alliance [https://perma.cc/9GES-LS6P]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Luật Cạnh Tranh [Competition Law], No. 27/2004/QH11 of Dec. 3, 2004 
(Viet.). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
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as multinational corporations (“MNCs”) have increasingly expanded their 
power across countries under the shadow of globalization.6 As MNCs 
transcend countries’ geographical borders, they face a problem in 
determining which country’s law will apply to their cross-border 
transactions. Generally, the national law of a country is applicable only 
within that country’s territory.7 The application of a country’s law, however, 
becomes more problematic when considering MNCs and cross-border 
transactions, which potentially affect multiple countries. When international 
cooperation surrounding these transactions is not available or too costly, 
some countries respond by simply applying their own competition law.8 
This extraterritorial application, however, can potentially harm cross-border 
business transactions.9  
The extraterritorial application of a country’s law is the unilateral effort 
of a country to extend its jurisdiction to acts conducted in other countries.10 
Although the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction of competition law11 is 
criticized12 for seemingly undermining the territorial principle of 
international law, the exercise of this jurisdiction is necessary when 
countries are unable to reach an agreement regarding cross-border 
transactions.  
                                                                                                             
 6. For example, Google bought Nokia in 2012.  Microsoft to Acquire Nokia’s 
Devices & Services Business, License Nokia’s Patents and Mapping Services, 
MICROSOFT NEWS CTR. (Sept. 3, 2013), https://news.microsoft.com/2013/09/03 
/microsoft-to-acquire-nokias-devices-services-business-license-nokias-patents-and- 
mapping-services/#sm.000wamleu1dzpd51pdc1m3ai3r4ao [https://perma.cc/WBG5 
-QBXB]. Walmart acquired Jet.com in 2016. Walmart Agrees to Acquire Jet.com, 
One of the Fastest Growing e-Commerce Companies in the U.S., WALMART (Aug. 8, 
2016), http://news.walmart.com/2016/08/08/walmart-agrees-to-acquire-jetcom-one-
of-the-fastest-growing-e-commerce-companies-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/7DFX-
V7NR]. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.B, C. 
 10. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 11. Rita Yi Man Li & Yi Lut Li, The Role of Competition Law: An Asian 
Perspective, 9 ASIAN SOC. SCI. 47, 47 (2013). 
 12. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the arguments posed by 
the Canadian government in the amicus brief submitted) and Part II.C (discussing 
the arguments posed by the Japanese government in the amicus briefs submitted). 
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Although many countries oppose the EACL, asserting that it violates 
international law,13 others utilize the EACL but often in different ways.14 
The international approach to the EACL is not unified and fails to recognize 
that some countries still adopt a “double standard” for the EACL, which 
occurs when one country opposes the application of another country’s law 
within its territory but seeks to apply its own law to other countries 
extraterritorially.15 This Article explains that the extraterritorial application 
of competition law by a country16 to acts that occur outside its territory is 
not contrary to international law if that application is properly limited. The 
EACL should be the unilateral action of one country only when the affected 
countries fail to find a common solution for a cross-border competition 
issue. Ultimately, this Article further proposes a model that should be 
applied to limit the extraterritorial jurisdiction of competition law. This 
model would require a country to scrutinize the link between the alleged act 
and its country and consider the interstate interests involved before deciding 
to exercise its jurisdiction.  
Part I of this Article discusses international law and the foundation of 
the extraterritorial application of law. Part II surveys the EACL 
approaches of four countries—Canada, the U.S., Japan, and Vietnam—
and illustrates that because the limit of international law on EACL is 
unclear, countries impose their own limits. Finally, Part III proposes a 
unified approach for all countries to use when considering the 
extraterritorial application of competition law.  
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOUNDATION OF THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAW 
Before surveying the EACL approaches of multiple countries, it is 
important to understand the foundation of the EACL. This Part first discusses 
the definition of “exterritorial” and the characteristics of completion law. 
Then, this Part discusses the relationship between jurisdiction and territory, as 
established by international law. Finally, this Part explains the landmark Lotus 
                                                                                                             
 13. For example, Canada and Japan made this assertion in amicus briefs 
submitted to U.S. courts. See discussion infra Part II.A.1, II.C.; Brief for 
Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1–2, United 
States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2001), 1996 
U.S. 1st Cir. Briefs LEXIS 11. 
 14. See discussion infra Part II. 
 15. For an example of a country that employs a “double standard” see 
discussion infra Part II.C. 
 16. This country is normally referred to as the “country of forum.” 
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case, in which the International Court of Justice held that a state may 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to acts occurring in foreign countries. 
A. The EACL in General 
The extraterritorial application of competition law has several aspects 
to consider. First, it is important to define “extraterritorial” and what it 
means to apply a country’s law extraterritorially. Second, understanding 
the EACL requires an understanding of the difference between the EACL 
and conflict of laws. Finally, competition law involves characteristics of 
both public and private law, which are important to understanding the 
overall approach to the EACL. 
1. Defining “Extraterritorial”  
Many articles have discussed the “extraterritoriality” of the EACL. 
Some authors treat extraterritoriality as the internationalization of 
domestic law,17 while others simply define extraterritoriality as “the 
application of domestic law to foreign conduct.”18 In the scholar Herbert 
Hovenkamp’s discussion of antitrust law as an extraterritorial regulatory 
policy, he does not expressly define “extraterritorial regulatory policy,” but 
acknowledges the considerable power of U.S. antitrust law to control 
conduct abroad.19 Another scholar David Gerber provides a more specific 
definition of EACL, calling it “unilateral jurisdictionalism [that] authorizes 
states to apply their own laws to conduct outside their territory under certain 
conditions—without the obligation to take the interests of other states into 
account.”20 Put simply, the EACL is best defined as the unilateral effort of 
a country to extend its jurisdiction to acts conducted in other countries.21 
Even the best definitions in the literature, however, fail to address important 
issues related to the EACL. 
                                                                                                             
 17. See, e.g., GEORGE N. ADDY, CHRIS MARGISON & RYAN DOIG, NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW: STRIKING THE 
RIGHT BALANCE 1–2 (2004) (on file with Louisiana Law Review). 
 18. See, e.g., Allan E. Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 
5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 449, 449 (1983). 
 19. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust as Extraterritorial Regulatory Policy, 48 
ANTITRUST BULL. 629, 629 (2003). 
 20. DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION: LAW, MARKETS, AND 
GLOBALIZATION 5 (2010). 
 21. See id. 
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2. Distinguishing the EACL from Conflict of Laws 
To avoid the conflation of the EACL and conflict of laws it is 
important to distinguish the two. Conflict of laws is a country’s set of rules 
which apply when a legal issue contains a foreign element and a domestic 
court must decide whether to apply foreign law or cede jurisdiction to a 
foreign court.22 Namely, conflict of laws deal with the following three 
questions. First, does the court of a country have jurisdiction to hear the 
case?23 Second, which country’s law should be applied to determine the 
outcome of the dispute?24 Third, when should the court of a country 
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment?25 Every modern legal system 
has its own domestic conflict of laws rules.26 These domestic rules address 
these three questions and help countries avoid conflicts and overlapping 
jurisdiction in private litigation. Moreover, at the international level, many 
countries have conventions that provide rules to determine the jurisdiction 
of courts and the applicable laws in cases involving foreign elements.27 
The difference between the EACL and conflict of laws hinges upon 
their relation to public and private law. Conflict of laws relates to private 
laws that regulate private relationships, while the EACL relates to public 
law.28 Public law regulates the relationship between private persons and 
the state acting in its capacity as mediator of the public good.29 Private 
law, however, regulates relationships between private parties.30 This type 
of law covers areas such as contracts, marriage, adoption, or certain torts.31 
Positivists distinguish these two types of law as duty-imposing laws and 
power-conferring laws.32 Public laws are duty-imposing laws, which 
                                                                                                             
 22. ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2005). 
 23. MAEBH HARDING, CONFLICT OF LAWS 2 (5th ed. 2014). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 
(2015); Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 
I.L.M. 1294; Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, Oct. 
2, 1973, 11 I.L.M. 1283. 
 28. Kit Barker, Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law, in PRIVATE 
LAW: KEY ENCOUNTERS WITH PUBLIC LAW 3, 3–4 (Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen 
eds., 2013). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id.  
 32. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 78 (1961). 
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require human beings to do, or abstain from doing, certain actions.33 By 
contrast, private laws are power-conferring laws, which “do not impose 
duties or obligations”34 but instead “provide individuals with facilities for 
realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by 
certain specified procedures and subject to certain conditions, structures 
of rights and duties within the coercive framework of the law.”35 
Private international law provides rules to determine whether a court 
in a cross-border case has territorial jurisdiction to recognize the power of 
a party in a private relationship. If the court has jurisdiction, private 
international law then provides rules to determine which country’s law 
should apply and regulate said private relationship.36 Because private law 
concerns the rights and obligations arising from private relationships, 
countries normally do not fight for jurisdiction in these cases; rather, 
countries seek solutions to facilitate litigation and achieve just outcomes 
through private international law principles.37 The EACL, in contrast, 
deals with public law which imposes duties on subjects. In cross-border 
cases, the EACL addresses whether a country can impose a duty on a 
person in a foreign territory.38 Thus, countries normally argue about 
overlapping powers to impose a duty on a person in a certain territory. 
3. Public and Private Law Aspects of Competition Law 
Competition law has the characteristics of public law because 
competition law imposes duties on subjects, such as the duty not to abuse 
a dominant position, the duty not to enter into anticompetitive agreements, 
the duty to comply with merger notification requirements, and the duty not 
to engage in unfair trade practices. In most jurisdictions, the public law 
character of competition law is also evident in the use of criminal or 
administrative sanctions.39 Competition laws typically provide for a public 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 27. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See HARDING, supra note 23. 
 37. In an effort to seek solutions, countries have created international 
conventions. See, e.g., HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 27. 
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (1945); 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, §45 
(Can.); Shitekidokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kouseitorihiki no Kakuho nikansuru 
Houritsu, [Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair 
Trade] [Antimonopoly Act], Law No. 54 of 1947, art. 89–118 (Japanese Law 
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mechanism, such as an administrative agency, to enforce laws and detect 
violations of the law. In addition, there is no choice of law rule in 
competition law, either under the laws of states or international 
conventions.40 Competition laws do not provide rules allowing its courts to 
apply foreign competition laws or rules to choose a forum in cases involving 
foreign elements.41 Similarly, there is no convention that governs conflict of 
competition law rules. Article 2(2)(h) of the Convention of 30 June 2005 on 
Choice of Court Agreements even states that “[t]his Convention shall not 
apply to . . . anti-trust (competition) matters.”42  
Although competition law has many public law characteristics, 
competition law in some jurisdictions has private law characteristics as 
well. For example, in Canada and the U.S., private parties can make civil 
claims for damages relating to violations of competition law. However, 
allowing private litigation does not make competition law private law. In 
Canada, only three sections of the Competition Act allow a private party 
to bring a competition case to the Competition Tribunal.43 Additionally, 
the private party must be granted leave under the Competition Act before 
making such an application to the Competition Tribunal.44 The right of a 
private party to make this application does not preclude the right of the 
Competition Bureau45 to proceed against the violator to protect public 
interest.46  
Besides private rights of action provided by the three sections, the 
Canadian Competition Act also allows a private party to recover damages 
suffered as a result of offenses related to competition or to the failure of 
any person to comply with an order of the Tribunal or other court under 
the Act.47 Therefore, the private litigation in this situation stems from a 
                                                                                                             
Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp [https://perma 
.cc/2GWJ-C2FZ] (Japan). 
 40. See Hannah L. Buxbaum & Ralf Michaels, Jurisdiction and Choice of 
Law in International Antitrust Law, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LITIGATION: 
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND COORDINATION 225 (Jürgen Basedow et al., eds. 2012), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3115&context=facu
lty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/XUC6-7337]. 
 41. Id. at 226. 
 42. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 27, at art. 
2(2)(h). 
 43. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, §§ 75–77 (Can.). 
 44. Id. § 103.1. 
 45. Our Organization, COMPETITION BUREAU OF CAN., http://www.competi 
tionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00125.html [https://perma.cc/6Y4N-H82 
Q] (last updated Nov. 5, 2015). 
 46. Competition Act, §§ 75–77. 
 47. Id. § 36. 
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public relationship between the state and the person who failed to comply 
with the obligation prescribed by the Competition Act. Likewise, in the 
United States, persons who violate the Sherman Act “shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony.”48 Although violations of the Sherman Act may cause 
damage to private parties, the violations are deemed to be contrary to 
public interests. Therefore, the damages plaintiffs claim in competition 
cases arise from the violation of a public obligation imposed by 
competition law. The damages are private consequences of a violation of 
a public obligation that is not established by any agreement between the 
two parties, but by the law itself.  
B. The Relation Between Territory and Jurisdiction 
According to international law principles, a country’s laws usually 
apply only within the country’s territory. In some instances, however, a 
country should extend its competition law jurisdiction to certain acts that 
occurred abroad. There are different situations in which an act that 
occurred abroad has a connection to the territory of the country of forum. 
Only some of these connections, however, are sufficient to trigger the 
EACL.  
1. Territorial Principle 
The territory of a country is an important element of international law 
in determining the sovereignty of a country. A country is obligated to 
respect the territory and the sovereignty of other countries.49 This 
territorial principle is universally recognized in international law.50 This 
principle allows a country to freely make and enforce its law against any 
entities, including foreign entities, operating or present in its territory.51 
This principle also proscribes the enforcement of a country’s legislation in 
another country without the reliance on a treaty.52 This principle fits with 
                                                                                                             
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 49. JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2d ed. 2008). 
 50. PETER MALANCZUK & MICHAEL BARTON AKEHURST, AKEHURST’S 
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 75–76 (Routledge 7th rev. ed. 
1997). 
 51. AUST, supra note 22, at 44. 
 52. Id. at 45. 
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legal positivism that asserts that “sovereignty means ultimate authority in 
a given territory.”53  
The territorial principle, however, indicates a rigid link between law 
and territory, making the principle unsuitable when considering the 
development of technology and international trade. For example, a price-
fixing cartel might be conducted in one country but have consequences in 
many other territories. Given the rigid link, there are several exceptions to 
the territorial principle which allow affected countries to exercise 
jurisdiction over certain acts that occurred abroad. One of these 
exceptions, the effects doctrine, is suitable to consider when drafting a 
unified approach to the EACL. 
a. Protective Principle 
The first exception to the territorial principle is the protective principle, 
which allows a country to exercise jurisdiction over a crime committed 
outside its territory when the crime threatens the country’s national 
security.54 The scope of this principle is not clear, however, because national 
security is a broad concept—one that might relate to economic or political 
issues—and countries often disagree about economic or political national 
security issues.55 Nevertheless, this protective principle should not apply to 
the EACL because it relates to criminal law rather than competition law. 
b. Universal Jurisdiction Principle 
Another exception to the territorial principle is the universal 
jurisdiction principle, which enables a country to claim jurisdiction over 
persons whose alleged crimes were committed outside the boundaries of 
that country, regardless of nationality, country of residence, or any other 
nexus with the prosecuting country.56 This principle is limited to certain 
                                                                                                             
 53. TURAN KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRA 
TERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, AND CHINA 192 (reprint ed. 
2013). 
 54. United Nations, Protective Principle, UNTERM, https://unterm.un.org 
/UNTERM/Display/Record/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=e13007c0bcc151378525724
1005cbc50 [https://perma.cc/295E-CHJE] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 
 55. See, e.g., Recent Development, Protective Principle of Jurisdiction 
Applied to Uphold Statute Intended to Have Extraterritorial Effect, 62 COLUM. L. 
REV. 371, 374–75 (1962) (criticizing a court’s finding of national security).  
 56. United Nations, Universal Jurisdiction, UNTERM, https://unterm.un.org 
/UNTERM/Display/Record/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=b0d82ed607beb0b8852570
1f0061aec9 [https://perma.cc/7VFF-5DGB] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 
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crimes, such as piracy, slavery, torture, war crimes, genocide, and other 
crimes against humanity under conventions, such as the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 198457 and Geneva Conventions of 1949.58 Similar to the 
protective principle, the universal jurisdiction principle should not apply 
to competition law because it is used to prosecute international crimes and 
protect international human rights.59  
c. Active Personality Principle 
The third exception is the active personality principle. The active 
personality principle, also known as the nationality principle, allows a 
country to assert criminal jurisdiction over the conduct of its nation’s 
citizens, even when the conduct occurred abroad.60 A state is not 
constrained to enact laws that apply only to its citizens who commit 
offenses within the country; a state may also enact laws that apply to the 
conduct of its citizens abroad and may be enforced in the country’s home 
courts. Such laws, however, cannot be enforced in another country unless 
a treaty allows for their application because of the territorial principle.61 
In competition law, two scenarios might raise questions about the 
jurisdiction of a country over the anticompetitive business practices of its 
citizens abroad. The first scenario involves a foreign-based subsidiary of 
a national MNC. For example, a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. MNC is 
accused of abuse of a dominant position in Canada. One might argue that 
a U.S. court should have jurisdiction in this case because the violation is 
conducted by a U.S. company’s subsidiary, and the nationality principle 
allows a state to regulate activities of its citizens abroad.62 However, the 
nationality of the foreign-based subsidiary and that of its mother company 
are different. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power, Co. held that a company, of which the 
shareholders are of Belgium nationality, “having been incorporated under 
                                                                                                             
 57. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 58. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 59. For critics of this principle see Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner, 
The Limits of Idealism, DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47, 47–63. 
 60. United Nations, Active Personality, UNTERM, http://unterm.un.org 
/UNTERM/Display/Record/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=80aca4bc91d0e57c8525724
1006eba9e [https://perma.cc/7GFU-TQE3] (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 
 61. AUST, supra note 22, at 45. 
 62. Id. 
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Canadian law and having its registered office in Toronto . . . is of Canadian 
nationality.”63 Therefore, despite the close relationship with a U.S. parent 
company, a Canadian subsidiary is a Canadian corporation and the active 
personality principle should not allow the U.S. to exercise its competition 
law.  
A second scenario involves the regulation of anticompetitive conduct 
of citizens in a foreign territory. For example, the CEOs of two U.S. 
corporations are both Canadian citizens, and they operate a price-fixing 
cartel in the U.S., affecting only the U.S. market. Although the active 
personality principle allows a state to regulate activities of its citizens 
abroad, to enforce such regulation in a foreign territory is normally 
controversial when a similar law and enforcement mechanism exist in the 
foreign territory. Thus, although the two Canadian CEOs violated the 
Canadian Competition Act, they are not harming the Canadian market and 
U.S law is available to punish their offenses. In this scenario, the active 
personality principle should not apply to allow Canada to assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of its competition laws.    
d. Passive Personality Principle  
The passive personality principle, another exception to the territorial 
principle, allows a country to claim jurisdiction over acts committed 
abroad against its own citizens by foreign citizens.64 This principle 
appeared in the late 19th century in the criminal codes of some countries 
and triggered conflicts between states.65 This principle is primarily applied 
in counterterrorism law and conventions.66 
The passive personality principle may arguably allow a country to 
enforce its competition law against the anticompetitive business practices 
of foreign persons in a foreign territory that have adverse effects on the 
country’s citizens in a foreign territory. For example, a U.S. company 
might abuse its dominant position in the U.S. market and harm Canadian 
companies doing business in the U.S. The Canadian Competition Act67 
could possibily be enforced in the U.S. to protect the U.S.-based Canadian 
                                                                                                             
 63. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 
1970 I.C.J. 3, 52 (Feb. 5). 
 64. Passive Personality, UNTERM, http://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/Display/Re 
cord/UNHQ/NA?OriginalId=b0b4495bac9b98f785257241006f6956 [https://perma 
.cc/Y4QT-H58D] (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). 
 65. John G. McCarthy, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in 
Combatting International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 298, 302 (1989). 
 66. AUST, supra note 22, at 45. 
 67. Id. 
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companies from such violations. However, in this situation, the violation’s 
connection to the Canadian Competition Act is weak, and U.S law is 
available to regulate the abusive conduct. Therefore, the passive personality 
principle should not apply to competition law. 
e. Effects Doctrine 
The final exception to the territorial principle is the effects doctrine. 
This exception is arguably the only one that should apply to competition 
law and should therefore be considered in drafting a unified approach to 
the EACL. According to the effects doctrine, a country may enforce its 
competition law against an anticompetitive business practice that took 
place completely abroad if the conduct has a substantial effect on its 
territory.68 The effects doctrine was adopted by the International Court of 
Justice in the landmark Lotus case.69 As a result of this decision in 1927, 
the effects doctrine has been applied by an increasing number of countries 
in the area of competition law despite strong opposition from many other 
countries.70    
2. The International Court of Justice Judgment in Lotus 
The extraterritorial principle is controversial and has been strongly 
opposed by many countries. In 1927, the ICJ discussed a notable conflict 
between France and Turkey in the Lotus case.71 In a milestone decision 
concerning the EACL, the ICJ changed the international law approach to 
the application of national law to violations conducted abroad.72  
On August 2, 1926, a collision occurred between the French mail 
steamer Lotus and the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt in the open sea.73 The 
Boz-Kourt sank, and eight Turkish citizens died.74 Lieutenant Demons, a 
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French citizen who was the watch officer on board the Lotus, was arrested by 
the Turkish police and prosecuted by the public prosecutor of Stamboul.75 
Demons argued that the Turkish court had no jurisdiction, but the Turkish 
court dismissed his objection and sentenced him to imprisonment for 80 days 
and a fine of 22 pounds.76  
The French government protested the arrest of Demons and sought to 
transfer the case from Turkish courts to French courts.77 The Turkish and 
French governments then agreed to bring the question of jurisdiction to the 
ICJ, previously called the “Permanent Court of International Justice.”78 
One of the questions the Court had to decide was whether Turkey “acted 
in conflict with the principles of international law.”79 The French 
government asked the ICJ to rule that the “jurisdiction to entertain criminal 
proceedings against the officer of the watch of a French ship, in connection 
with the collision which occurred on the high seas between that vessel and 
a Turkish ship, belongs exclusively to the French Courts.”80 The Turkish 
government simply asked the ICJ to grant jurisdiction to the Turkish 
courts.81  
The French government argued that international law did not allow a 
state to take proceedings with regard to offenses committed by foreigners 
abroad simply by reason of the victim’s nationality when the offense was 
committed on board the French vessel.82 On the other hand, the Turkish 
government argued that “no principle of international criminal law exists 
which would debar Turkey from exercising the jurisdiction which she 
clearly possesses to entertain an action for damages, [and thus] that 
country has jurisdiction to institute criminal proceedings.”83 
The Court observed that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive 
rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in any form in the 
territory of another State.”84 This means that a state cannot exercise its 
jurisdiction outside its territory without permission of an international rule. 
The Court, however, went on to say, “[i]t does not . . . follow that 
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own 
                                                                                                             
 75. Id. at 10–11. 
 76. Id. at 11. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 6. 
 81. Id. at 8. 
 82. Id. at 22. 
 83. Id. at 9. 
 84. Id. at 18. 
438 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77 
 
 
 
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken 
place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of 
international law.”85 The ICJ then proceeded to ascertain the possible 
international rule that would prohibit Turkey from prosecuting Demons. It 
observed that: 
Consequently, once it is admitted that the effects of the offence 
[sic] were produced on the Turkish vessel, it becomes impossible 
to hold that there is a rule of international law which prohibits 
Turkey from prosecuting Lieutenant Demons because of the fact 
that the author of the offence [sic] was on board the French ship.86  
In response to the French government’s assertion of exclusive jurisdiction 
over French territory, the ICJ said that: 
If, therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its 
effects on a vessel flying another flag or in foreign territory, the 
same principles must be applied as if the territories of two different 
States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be drawn 
that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to 
which the ship on which the effects of the offence [sic] have taken 
place belongs, from regarding the offence [sic] as having been 
committed in its territory and prosecuting, accordingly, the 
delinquent.87 
The Lotus judgment provides three notable points regarding the 
extraterritorial application of a state’s public law. First, a state can apply 
its law extraterritorially unless constrained by an international rule.88 The 
ICJ’s approach contradicted the argument of countries that oppose the 
application, particularly the French government’s position that a state can 
apply its law extraterritorially only when the state cites an international 
rule that allows such an application.89 This rule means that the 
extraterritorial application of a nation’s public law is a natural right of 
states—not a right that derives from permission of any international treaty. 
The ICJ emphasized that “all that can be required of a State is that it should 
not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; 
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within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its 
sovereignty.”90 
Second, the judgment made a clear distinction between prescriptive, 
adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdictions over an act conducted abroad.91 
Prescriptive jurisdiction refers to the power to prescribe rules regulating 
foreign conduct.92 Adjudicative jurisdiction is the power to subject foreign 
parties to judicial process.93 Finally, enforcement jurisdiction is the 
jurisdiction to enforce law abroad.94 Thus, according to the ICJ’s judgment, 
states are relatively free to make laws that regulate foreign conduct because 
the prescriptive jurisdiction is conducted within a country’s territory. 
Likewise, because the adjudicative jurisdiction is mostly exercised within 
the territory of the country that made the law, it is not prohibited by the Lotus 
judgment. The enforcement jurisdiction is more limited because this 
exercise of jurisdiction may violate the territorial principle.95 Enforcement 
jurisdiction is allowed only if it is conducted within the territory of the 
country that made the law.96  
However, these three jurisdictions are inseparable, and the limit placed 
on enforcement jurisdiction also influences the scope of the prescriptive 
and adjudicative jurisdictions. In competition law, without the cooperation 
or approval of the country where the conduct occurred, a second country 
could not obtain the information needed to enforce its competition laws 
extraterritorially. Consequently, although a country may have prescriptive 
and adjudicative jurisdiction within its territory, its authority to address a 
breach of its competition laws in a foreign country can be difficult. 
Therefore, the exercise of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdictions is not 
unlimited.  
The third notable point on the EACL made in Lotus relates to the effect 
of foreign conduct on the country whose laws were violated. This rule can 
be regarded as a limit set by international law on the freedom of a country 
to exercise jurisdiction within its territory with respect to conduct that 
occurred in a foreign country. According to the ICJ, “it might be observed 
that the effect is a factor of outstanding importance in offences [sic] such 
as manslaughter, which are punished precisely in consideration of their 
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effects rather than of the subjective intention of the delinquent.”97 From 
the private actor’s perspective, the ICJ’s judgment imposes an obligation 
on entities residing in a country to comply not only with the laws of that 
country, but with applicable foreign laws as well. In competition law, 
MNCs are likely to be aware of this obligation because their business 
decisions made in a particular country may have adverse effects in other 
countries. A MNC that fails to consider the application of the competition 
laws of countries affected by its business decisions might find itself subject 
to unpredicted foreign competition law judgments. 
In summary, the ICJ ruling in Lotus allows a state to exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to acts occurring in foreign countries. Following 
Lotus, countries have applied the ICJ’s judgment differently to extend their 
jurisdiction to acts occurring abroad. To promote cooperative international 
relations between countries and to enhance the certainty of the cross-
border legal environment for entities, this right must be limited.  
II. A GLOBAL SURVEY: VARIOUS APPROACHES TO THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW 
The limit of international law on the EACL is uncertain. Due to this 
uncertainty, countries have imposed their own limits. An analysis of Canada 
and the United States illustrates the approaches of two predominantly 
common law countries and highlights the substantive differences between 
their approaches. An analysis of the Japanese and Vietnamese approaches 
to the EACL illustrates the approaches of two non-common law countries. 
The discussion of Japan highlights the double standard in the EACL that 
exists in some countries. The discussion of Vietnam serves as an example 
of a developing country’s approach to the EACL.  
A. The Canadian Approach 
Canada is a country that takes a restrictive view of the territorial 
doctrine and is concerned about the negative effects of the EACL, 
especially the EACL by U.S. courts. Scholars acknowledge that the 
Canadian economy is especially vulnerable to the unwarranted exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.98 In addition to problems concerning Canadian 
sovereignty and the security of Canadian entities, the unilateral EACL by 
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foreign states in Canadian territory might impair certain Canadian policies, 
such as the immunity program.99  
1. The Opposition of Canada to the Exercise of Foreign Jurisdiction 
in Canadian Territory 
In response to the adverse effects of the overuse of foreign 
extraterritoriality, Canadian provincial legislatures have enacted several 
statutes to block the foreign EACL.100 First, under the Ontario Business 
Records Protection Act, the attorney general may obtain a court order 
prohibiting a person from removing a business record101 of any business 
carried on in Ontario pursuant to an order made by a foreign authority.102 
The taking of such a business record is legal only if it is consistent with 
the company’s legal practice or is allowed by Ontario or Canadian law.103 
The Quebec Business Concerns Record Act sets out the same rule.104 
Ignoring the relationship between Ontario or Quebec and other Canadian 
provinces, this regulation serves to strengthen the territorial principle and 
weaken the EACL of other countries within Canadian territory. In Canada, 
the unilateral order of an authority in a foreign jurisdiction outside Ontario 
or Quebec is regarded as the exercise of jurisdiction by a foreign country, 
and according to the principle in Lotus, this type of order is likely 
prohibited by international law.105 Therefore, Canadian law, unable to 
impose a duty on foreign authorities, prohibits Canadian entities from 
complying with a foreign authority’s unilateral order for documents. 
These blocking provisions are consistent with the judgment in Lotus. 
Requesting a foreign-based company to submit a document without the 
approval of the country of conduct is an exercise of power in the territory 
of another state. Such a request, therefore, is prohibited by international 
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law. Moreover, the obligation not to transfer a business record, as provided 
by the business records legislation, is the right of Canadian-based 
companies to refuse EACL. Accordingly, any foreign authority that wants 
to legally obtain business records from Ontario or Quebec has to comply with 
procedures allowed by the laws of these provinces or the parliament of 
Canada.  
The Ontario and Quebec blocking provisions are also consistent with Part 
III of the Competition Act of Canada providing for mutual legal assistance. 
These provisions enhance Canadian sovereignty in multi-jurisdictional 
competition cases. According to section 30.03 of the Competition Act of 
Canada, a foreign state that has entered into a mutual assistance agreement106 
can make a request for assistance pursuant to the agreement.107 This section 
authorizes the minister of justice to handle such requests.108 If the minister of 
justice approves the request for a search and seizure, the minister of justice 
shall provide the commissioner with any documents or information 
necessary to apply for the search warrant.109  
Federal legislation also protects Canada from the potential negative 
effects of the EACL and helps strengthen Canadian sovereignty. For 
example, Section 8 of the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act provides 
that where the recognition or enforcement of a foreign tribunal’s judgment 
in Canada has or is likely to have adverse effects on Canadian interests or 
sovereignty, the attorney general of Canada may “declare that the 
judgment shall not be recognized or enforceable in any manner in Canada” 
or, in the case of a money judgement, may decrease the amount owed.110 
In addition, section 9(1) empowers a Canadian citizen to sue and recover 
from a person in whose favor the abovementioned foreign judgment is 
given.111 Thus besides allowing the attorney general to declare a foreign 
judgment unenforceable in Canada, the Act provides measures for the 
Canadian resident to recover the damages and expenses incurred related to 
such a judgment.112 Section 9(2) allows the court to order the seizure and 
sale of any property in which the person against whom the judgment made 
under section 9(1) is rendered.113  
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In addition to legislation, the Canadian government has resisted the 
EACL on a case-by-case basis. In Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,114 
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992, the Canadian government 
submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of a petitioner.115 Canada was 
“concerned with the exercise of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction where it 
directly conflicts with the exercise of Canada’s territorial jurisdiction.”116 
The Canadian government first argued against the extraterritorial exercise 
of the Sherman Act117 by asserting that “[c]ustomary international law, 
which has been adopted as U.S. law, precludes one state’s exercise of 
economic regulatory jurisdiction over acts occurring in the territory of 
another state where such exercise would cause a substantial conflict.”118 
The Canadian government then argued using the presumption against the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, claiming that “[n]either 
the plain language nor the legislative history of the Sherman Act 
demonstrates a congressional intent to apply it extraterritorially so as to 
conflict with and undermine another sovereign’s territorial laws.”119 The 
final argument made by the Canadian government was that the Foreign 
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, which amended the Sherman 
Act, does not express an intent to override the territorial preference in 
situations of legal conflict under U.S. and international law.120 This case, 
in addition to legislation, illustrates Canada’s opposition to the EACL in 
Canada. 
2. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Canadian Competition Act  
Although Canada opposes the EACL in Canada, Canada sometimes 
wishes to apply its laws extraterritorially. The extraterritorial jurisdiction 
of the Canadian Competition Act, however, is not clearly stated.121 
Sections that define violations of the Act—for example, conspiracies 
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between competitors,122 bid-rigging,123 deceptive marketing practices,124 
restrictive trade practices,125 or mergers126—use words such as “person,” 
“every person,” “every one,” or “any person” to describe the subject of the 
conduct. These words refer to individuals and corporations127 in general, 
regardless of nationality or place of residence. Without clear language or 
a clear statement of territorial jurisdiction, it is difficult to determine 
whether the Act applies to conduct that occurs outside of Canadian 
territory. Another provision, section 46, provides some guidance in 
making the determination of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Section 46, pertaining to foreign directive, seems to relate to acts 
occurring outside of Canada. This section provides  
[a]ny corporation, wherever incorporated, that carries on business in 
Canada and that implements, in whole or in part in Canada, a 
directive, instruction, intimation of policy or other communication to 
the corporation or any person from a person in a country other than 
Canada who is in a position to direct or influence the policies of the 
corporation, which communication is for the purpose of giving effect 
to a conspiracy, combination, agreement or arrangement entered into 
outside Canada that, if entered into in Canada, would have been in 
contravention of section 45, is, whether or not any director or officer 
of the corporation in Canada has knowledge of the conspiracy, 
combination, agreement or arrangement, guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine in the discretion of the 
court.128 
According to the plain language of this section, the alleged person is liable 
under this section only if the person “carries on business in Canada,”129 
but the Competition Act does not define what it means to “carry on 
business in Canada.” Therefore, the possible interpretation of the 
extraterritorial application depends on the guidance defining this phrase.  
If “carry on business in Canada” means having a permanent 
establishment in Canada, section 46 of the Competition Act does not have 
extraterritorial application. According to the Convention between Canada 
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and the United States of America With Respect to Taxes on Income and 
on Capital, “the term ‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed place of 
business through which the business of a resident of a Contracting State is 
wholly or partly carried on.”130 This Convention also provides that, “[t]he 
term ‘permanent establishment’ shall include especially: (a) A place of 
management; (b) A branch; (c) An office; (d) A factory; (e) A workshop; 
and (f) A mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction 
of natural resources.”131 
Canadian tax law indicates that “carry on business in Canada” might 
have a broader meaning than having a permanent establishment in Canada. 
Section 253(b) of the Income Tax Act provides,  
[W]here in a taxation year a person who is a non-resident 
person . . . solicits orders or offers anything for sale in Canada 
through an agent or servant, whether the contract or transaction is 
to be completed inside or outside Canada or partly in and partly 
outside Canada . . . the person shall be deemed, in respect of the 
activity or disposition, to have been carrying on business in 
Canada in the year.132 
In Maya Forestales S.A. v The Queen, the Tax Court of Canada, 
commenting on this section of the Income Tax Act, observed that “it is quite 
clear that Parliament’s intent in creating the presumption was to subject non-
resident persons to Canadian tax provided they carry out a minimum amount 
of commercial activity within Canada’s borders.”133 The court then 
concluded that “the purpose of section 253 is to extend Canada’s tax 
jurisdiction to non-resident persons based on certain activities that they carry 
out within Canada’s borders.”134 The tax court’s judgement in Maya 
Forestales means that a person is considered carrying on business in 
Canada only if that person at least conducts a commercial activity within 
Canadian territory. In this situation, section 46 of the Competition Act 
does not have extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, given the 
development of technology, an offer, an order, or a commercial activity 
might be made from a foreign country to Canadian buyers online. 
Therefore, with online activity, the phrase “carry on business in Canada” 
may be interpreted more broadly. If the phrase included business activities 
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that are conducted outside Canadian territory, but affect Canada, section 
46 would have extraterritorial application.   
Additionally, section 109 and section 110 on merger notification may 
provide a clearer rule concerning the extraterritorial application of the 
Competition Act. These sections require participants to a merger to submit 
a merger notification to the Competition Bureau if the merger meets 
certain criteria. Parties to mergers who had more than 400 million dollars 
in aggregate assets or aggregate gross revenue from sales in, from, or into 
Canada at a predetermined time are subject to the requirement of merger 
notification under the Competition Act.135 Section 110 provides the 
transaction’s size threshold for different types of mergers. The threshold 
relies on the aggregate value of the assets of participating parties together 
with their affiliates in Canada, among others.136 
These regulations indicate that the Competition Act of Canada might 
have extraterritorial application. Under sections 109 and 110, the Act may 
regulate mergers conducted outside Canadian territory that affect Canada 
through a corporation that carries on an operating business in Canada. For 
example, suppose A and B are U.S. companies, and A acquires B in the 
U.S. A and B may have to send notification of the merger to the Canadian 
commissioner if the parties meet the size criteria set out in section 109 and 
the assets of B1, a Canadian affiliate controlled by B, exceed $700 
million.137 This acquisition is conducted by U.S. companies within the 
territory of the U.S., and B1 is a Canadian company which does not 
participate in the acquisition. The acquisition has effects on the Canadian 
market because the decisions of B1 might be influenced by the post-
merger companies. Sections 109 and 110, therefore, mean that the 
Competition Act to some extent might have extraterritorial application.138 
The Competition Bureau, however, does not enforce the Competition 
Act unilaterally in cross-border merger cases. The Bureau provided in a 
submission to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) that the Bureau often seeks extensive 
cooperation with foreign competition authority in reviewing transnational 
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mergers.139 The Bureau is also willing to coordinate with foreign 
counterparts when a cross-border merger is likely to have adverse 
competitive effects in the related countries.140 The Bureau asserts that 
consistent and coordinated remedies help avoid potential friction 
stemming from situations in which a remedy in one jurisdiction may not 
be acceptable in another and can lead to more efficient and effective 
resolutions than would be attained through unilateral enforcement 
action.141  
In practice, the Canadian Competition Tribunal has discussed the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Canadian Competition Act in Director 
of Investigation and Research v. D & B Companies of Canada Ltd. 
(“D&B”).142 In D&B, the petitioner alleged that the respondent abused a 
dominant position in the supply of scanner-based market tracking services 
in Canada.143 Although this case does not directly involve extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, the Tribunal mentions the issue in the discussion of the 
geographic dimension of the market.144 The Tribunal referred to the 
discussion of one scholar145 regarding the need to extend “the reach of the 
Canadian abuse of dominance provisions to assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in cases in which the ‘foreign commerce of Canada’ is 
adversely affected.”146 Justice McKeown, writing for the Tribunal, 
observed, 
If Parliament had simply referred in paragraph (a) [of section 79(1)] 
to control of a market, “market” having both product and 
geographic dimensions, the section could apply to situations where 
there were [sic] no direct connection to Canadian consumers. It 
could have been used for aggressive, extraterritorial application to 
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protect Canadian firms operating in other markets in which 
Canadian consumers do not buy the product.147 
Justice McKeown then wrote, “I am here concerned, however, with the 
current wording, not the merits of the proposed reform.”148 This means the 
Tribunal relied on the text of section 79(1)(a). Although D&B did not 
focus on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Canadian Competition Act, 
the discussion of the Tribunal expressed a point of view consistent with 
the territorial principle.  
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not heard any competition 
case concerning the question of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Competition Act, its approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Canada 
reflected in criminal cases is cautious. The Court’s opinion in criminal 
cases suggests its potential approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
the Canadian Competition Act. The Supreme Court of Canada in general 
scrutinizes the territorial principle and the international comity while 
deciding the jurisdiction of Canadian courts in cross-border cases. In 2007, 
the Court emphasized in R v. Hape that Canadian law cannot be enforced 
in another state’s territory without the other state’s consent.149 This is a 
strict approach to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Canadian law. In 1985, 
Justice La Forest wrote in Libman v. The Queen that: 
The territorial principle in criminal law was developed by the 
courts to respond to two practical considerations, first, that a 
country has generally little direct concern for the actions of 
malefactors abroad; and secondly, that other states may 
legitimately take umbrage if a country attempts to regulate matters 
taking place wholly or substantially within their territories. For 
these reasons the courts adopted a presumption against the 
application of laws beyond the realm . . . .150  
The Court also acknowledged the necessity of the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of law.151 It observed that confining national criminal law to 
national territory would have provided an easy escape for international 
criminals.152 Justice La Forest asserted that “[t]his country has a legitimate 
interest in prosecuting persons for activities that take place abroad but have 
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an unlawful consequence here.”153 He also laid out the substantial links 
principle, providing that courts should “consider the substantial links that 
connected the crime to that jurisdiction” when determining whether a 
crime should be prosecuted in a particular area.154 
Thus, the opinions on the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Canadian Supreme Court seem to be strict and consistent over time. As a 
general rule, Canadian laws cannot be enforced in another country’s 
territory, but they can have extraterritorial jurisdiction in some specific 
situations. The justification for the Canadian courts to exercise its jurisdiction 
extraterritorially is the “unlawful consequence”155 or “substantial link”156 
between the act occurring abroad and Canada.  
However, among the cross-border cases Canadian courts have heard, 
there is no case involving an offense by a foreigner in a foreign territory 
that has an adverse effect on Canada. The substantial links principle, 
therefore, has not brought about any controversy over the jurisdiction of a 
Canadian court like that of the effects doctrine in Lotus. Even in Libman, 
in which a significant portion of the offense involved conduct in Canada 
even though the victims were harmed abroad, the link between the crime 
and Canada was obviously substantial.157  
In 1997, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. O.B.158 dealt with the 
question of “whether a Canadian court has jurisdiction to try the appellant 
for an offence [sic] committed entirely in the United States.”159 In this 
case, the appellant was charged with “touching his granddaughter’s body 
for a sexual purpose” in his transport truck during a trip from Canada to 
the U.S.160 The offense was conducted entirely in the United States 
territory.161 Justice Abella observed that 
[t]he offence [sic] was one which in every respect occurred 
outside Canada, albeit in a Canadian vehicle on a trip from Canada 
with two Canadians in it. Other than in s. 7, the Criminal Code 
does not purport to assume original jurisdiction over criminal 
activity in foreign territories simply because the activity was 
carried on by Canadians in a Canadian vehicle. There must be 
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more than Canadian residence or vehicular ownership; there must 
be a significant link between Canada and the formulation, 
initiation, or commission of the offence. There is no such link here 
with respect to any part of the offence.162  
Justice Abella then concluded that the Canadian court had no jurisdiction 
to try the appellant.163 In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal did not 
apply the active personality principle to grant Canadian courts jurisdiction. 
This decision by the appellate court suggests that the nationality of the 
violator alone is not a sufficient substantial link to confer jurisdiction on a 
Canadian court. 
Canada has consistently favored a largely territorial approach to the 
enforcement of the Canadian Competition Act. The Supreme Court, 
however, has allowed extraterritorial application in criminal cases where the 
acts in question have substantial links to Canada.164 Although “substantial 
links” is not well-defined, it requires more than the mere involvement of a 
Canadian citizen. Therefore, the extraterritorial application of the 
Competition Act is still uncertain; sections 109 and 110, however, provide 
the best support for extraterritorial application, as the Competition Bureau 
and courts have the power under these sections to govern mergers that take 
place abroad by foreign corporations if the mergers meet certain criteria.165 
If Canada chooses to enforce extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition 
Act in the future, it should reconsider the blocking statutes and the Foreign 
Extraterritorial Measures Act,166 as these statutes would conflict with the 
Competition Act’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and create a double standard 
regarding the EACL in Canada. 
B. The American Approach 
The U.S. is a country that vigorously exercises extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the area of antitrust law.167 However, there are divergent 
opinions and practices related to the extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust 
law in the United States. The divergence stems from the unclear statement 
of the law. This section analyzes the U.S. approach to the EACL, 
especially how U.S. courts limit the effects doctrine by taking into account 
foreign country interests, international comity, and sovereign immunity. 
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This section also discusses the application of foreign competition law in 
U.S. territory.  
1. The Territorial Principle and Presumption Against the 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act 
U.S. antitrust law includes a number of statutes, with the three primary 
statutes being the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.168 The Sherman Act proscribes collusion and 
monopolization.169 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal.”170 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states 
that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”171 Likewise, the Clayton Act 
defines “commerce” to mean “trade or commerce among the several States 
and with foreign nations.”172 Although this definition of “commerce” 
refers to trade or commerce “with foreign nations,” it is not clear whether 
“commerce” includes violations conducted entirely abroad by foreign 
individuals or entities or whether there should be at least one U.S. citizen 
involved in the alleged conduct. Similarly, the extent to which the 
Sherman Act will apply to acts conducted abroad is also unclear.  
In his discussion about the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman 
Act, one commentator, Larry Kramer, asserted that “Congress seldom 
thinks about questions of extraterritoriality, which is why so few federal 
statutes address it.”173 William Dodge takes a different approach, arguing 
that “acts of Congress should presumptively apply only to conduct that 
causes effects within the United States regardless of where that conduct 
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occurs.”174 Because the intention of the Congress is unclear, the courts must 
fill the gap.175 
The first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act was American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co.176 in 1909. In this case, both the plaintiff and defendant 
were U.S. corporations, but the alleged monopolization occurred in Panama 
and Costa Rica.177 In hearing the plaintiff’s appeal, the Court observed that 
“the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other states. It is 
surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of 
Congress.”178 This observation implies that the American Banana Court 
presumed that the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act was confined to the 
territory of the U.S. The Court then concluded that  
it alleges no case under the act of Congress, and discloses nothing 
that we can suppose to have been a tort where it was done. A 
conspiracy in this country to do acts in another jurisdiction does 
not draw to itself those acts and make them unlawful, if they are 
permitted by the local law.179 
Therefore, the Court’s opinion indicates that the U.S. does not apply the 
active personality and passive personality principles to the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of American antitrust laws.  
Four years after American Banana, the Court slightly changed its 
interpretation of the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in U.S. 
v. Pacific and Arctic Railway Navigation Co.180 In this case, the 
defendants, which included a U.S. corporation and a Canadian 
corporation, engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade 
and commerce with one another.181 The cartel effectively eliminated and 
destroyed competition in the business of transporting freight and 
passengers between various ports in the U.S. and Canada.182 The 
defendants contended that U.S. antitrust law did not apply because part of 
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the transportation route was outside the U.S,183 but the Court rejected this 
argument.184 It observed that “it was a control to be exercised over 
transportation in the United States, and, so far, is within the jurisdiction of 
the laws of the United States, criminal and civil.”185 The Court then 
claimed jurisdiction over the foreign defendant asserting that “[i]f we may 
not control foreign citizens or corporations operating in foreign territory, 
we certainly may control such citizens and corporations operating in our 
territory, as we undoubtedly may control our own citizens and our own 
corporations.”186 
Although the Supreme Court in Pacific and Arctic asserted that it may 
not control foreign corporations operating in foreign territory, it held, in 
contrast to American Banana, that jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is 
not confined to U.S. territory.187 Although the alleged collusion was 
conducted only partly within U.S. territory, the Court concluded that the 
conduct was entirely within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act.188 This 
finding suggests that jurisdiction under the Sherman Act extends to a 
violation of the act that is, at least in part, conducted abroad. However, in 
Pacific and Arctic, there was at least some connection to the U.S.—the 
foreign defendant colluded with a U.S. corporation and the business of the 
foreign defendant was conducted partly in the U.S. This connection might 
explain why the Court did not provide extensive reasons justifying its 
divergence from the American Banana approach to jurisdiction under the 
Sherman Act.  
2. The Effects Doctrine and the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the 
Sherman Act 
Although the Supreme Court in American Banana asserted that acts 
conducted abroad are outside the jurisdiction of the U.S., this interpretation 
has not been strictly followed by lower courts. In 1945, the Court of Appeal 
for the Second Circuit outlined an “effects” test for determining the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in United States v. 
Aluminum Company of America (“Alcoa”).189 In this case, the defendants 
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entered into agreements to form cartels in 1931190 and 1936,191 which were 
alleged to have had an adverse competitive effect on the U.S. market. 
Judge Learned Hand, in delivering the opinion of the court, wrote that “we 
are concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the 
conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it.”192 
Judge Hand referred to American Banana to illustrate that Congress did 
not intend to punish all whom its courts could catch for conduct that had 
no consequence within the United States. He then asserted that “[o]n the 
other hand, it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even 
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that 
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these 
liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.”193  
Judge Hand proposed two conditions to consider when determining 
whether an act conducted abroad falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Sherman Act. First, there must be an intent to affect U.S. imports.194 A 
cartel entered into outside U.S. territory might affect U.S. trade even if the 
parties did not intend to do so; these effects might result indirectly through 
international trade. Analyzing this first condition, Judge Hand stated that 
the Sherman Act was enacted to cover agreements that intend to affect 
U.S. trade.195 Second, there must be an actual effect upon imports into the 
United States.196 Judge Hand refers to an example of cartels that were 
entered into with the intent to affect imports entering the U.S. but which 
had no actual effect upon the imports.197 Following this example, Judge 
Hand asserted that “the [Sherman] Act does not cover agreements, even 
though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is 
shown actually to have had some effect upon them.”198 Therefore, under 
this test, when both conditions are satisfied, a cartel conducted abroad is 
within the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. 
In 1982, the U.S. Congress expressed more clearly its intention to 
cover certain acts conducted abroad by passing the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (“FTAIA”), which incorporates the effects test 
proposed by Judge Hand.199 The FTAIA provides that conduct involving 
                                                                                                             
 190. Id. at 440. 
 191. Id. at 443. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 444. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. 
 199. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6A (2012). 
2016] EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF COMPETITION LAW 455 
 
 
 
trade with foreign nations to which the Sherman Act applies must have a 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce 
in the United States.200 In Kruman v. Christie’s International, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeal, referring to the phrase “direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect” in the FTAIA, said that “this limit will 
likely prevent conduct that merely has an ancillary effect on our markets 
from being actionable under our antitrust laws.”201  
However, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act provided 
for under the FTAIA is broader than the approach suggested by Judge 
Hand in Alcoa because the FTAIA does not take into account the intent to 
affect trade, but rather focuses only on the effects. The FTAIA allows the 
Sherman Act to cover conduct that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable effect on trade or commerce.202 The Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) explain subsection 
6A of the FTAIA in the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International 
Operations203:  
[The DOJ and FTC] apply the “direct, substantial, and reasonably 
foreseeable” standard of the FTAIA . . . in cases in which a cartel 
of foreign enterprises, or a foreign monopolist, reaches the U.S. 
market through any mechanism that goes beyond direct sales, such 
as the use of an unrelated intermediary, as well as in cases in which 
foreign vertical restrictions or intellectual property licensing 
arrangements have an anticompetitive effect on U.S. commerce.204 
Hartford Fire Insurance was an antitrust case in which the Supreme 
Court applied the Sherman Act to conduct that took place completely 
abroad after considering Judge Hand’s test from Alcoa.205 This case 
involved a number of U.S. and London-based companies.206 The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants, a group of London reinsurers and brokers, 
colluded to coerce primary insurers in the U.S. to offer commercial general 
liability coverage only on a claims-made basis.207 A different group of 
London reinsurers were charged with another conspiracy to withhold 
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reinsurance for pollution coverage.208 The defendants asserted that 
“applying the [Sherman] Act to their conduct would conflict significantly 
with British law.”209  
Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the Court, found that U.S. 
antitrust law can be applied to conduct that is deemed legal in the state 
where it took place.210 Justice Souter cited the lower court’s decision in 
Alcoa, saying that “it is well established by now that the Sherman Act 
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact 
produce some substantial effect in the United States.”211 He observed that 
the alleged conduct of the foreign defendants was intended to, and did in 
fact, have a substantial effect on the U.S. insurance market,212 satisfying 
the two elements of Judge Hand’s effects test from Alcoa. The Court 
further held that “[e]ven assuming that a court may decline to exercise 
Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct in an appropriate case, 
international comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in 
the circumstances alleged here.”213 
The most recent case testing the extraterritorial application of the 
Sherman Act is Motorola Mobility v. AU Optronics, in which the court 
considered the language from the FTAIA.214 Motorola, a company that 
manufactured and sold cellular telephones, and its foreign subsidiaries 
bought liquid-crystal display (LCD) panels and incorporated them into cell 
phones manufactured by the parent and its subsidiaries.215 Motorola 
alleged that several foreign manufacturers of the panels violated the 
Sherman Act by engaging in price-fixing.216 Judge Posner analyzed the 
effects of the defendants’ alleged cartel on the U.S. and observed that  
[o]nly about 1 percent of the panels were bought by, and delivered 
to, Motorola in the United States; the other 99 percent were bought 
by, paid for, and delivered to its foreign subsidiaries . . . . Forty-
two percent of all the panels were bought by the subsidiaries and 
incorporated by them into products that were then shipped to 
Motorola in the United States for resale by Motorola (which did 
none of the manufacturing). Another 57 percent of the panels were 
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also bought by the subsidiaries, but were incorporated into 
products that were sold abroad as well . . . .217 
Judge Posner then asserted that the court should ignore 57% of the 
panels from Motorola’s claim because any claim involving those panels 
was clearly barred by the FTAIA because the panels were sold abroad.218 
Although the district court had ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding 42% 
of the panels was barred by the FTAIA,219 the Seventh Circuit required 
that Motorola “show that the defendants’ price fixing of [these] panels that 
they sold abroad and that became components of cellphones imported by 
Motorola had ‘a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on 
commerce within the United States.”220 Judge Posner then contended:  
The alleged price fixers are not selling the panels in the United 
States. They are selling them abroad to foreign companies (the 
Motorola subsidiaries) that incorporate them into products that are 
then exported to the United States for resale by the parent. The 
effect of component price fixing on the price of the product of 
which it is a component is indirect . . . .221 
The Seventh Circuit continued, stating that “[t]he effect of the alleged 
price fixing on that commerce in this case is mediated by Motorola’s 
decision on what price to charge U.S. consumers for the cellphones 
manufactured abroad that are alleged to have contained a price-fixed 
component.”222 Judge Posner asserted that if the defendants were 
overcharging, they were overcharging other foreign manufacturers.223 He 
also cited the U.S Supreme Court’s warning “that rampant extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign 
nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.’”224 
The Seventh Circuit then upheld the district court’s ruling holding that 
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[t]he FTAIA applies to Motorola’s foreign injury claims because 
they are based on nonimport conduct involving trade with foreign 
nations. These claims do not fall under the FTAIA’s domestic 
injury exception because they do not arise from any domestic 
effect. . . . Motorola’s claims based on overseas purchases by its 
foreign affiliates (the Category II and III claims) are dismissed.225 
The interpretations of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman 
Act by U.S. courts are difficult to reconcile, as the decision of the Second 
Circuit in Alcoa is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in American 
Banana. Moreover, the two-condition effects test, introduced in Alcoa, is 
supported by other courts, including the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire 
Insurance, and reflected in the FTAIA.226 This indicates that Congress and 
the judiciary do not intend to confine the application of the Sherman Act 
to the territory of the U.S. However, this support does not mean that the 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is unlimited. 
In addition to considering the intent and substantial effects of the alleged 
conduct on U.S. trade, the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the 
Sherman Act also considers international comity and the sovereign 
immunity of foreign countries. 
3. Consideration of Foreign Country Interests and International 
Comity 
Although court decisions on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Sherman Act have differed over time, the decisions have not undermined 
foreign sovereign interests or the international law principle of 
international comity. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, Judge 
Choy delivered the opinion for the Ninth Circuit, stating that “[t]he effects 
test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations’ 
interests.”227 He then introduced a three-part analysis. First, a court must 
consider the actual or intended effect on U.S. foreign commerce.228 
Second, a court must consider whether the effect is sufficiently significant 
to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and therefore a civil 
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violation of the antitrust laws.229 Third, a court must consider whether the 
interests of the U.S., including the magnitude of the effect on U.S. foreign 
commerce, are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to 
justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.230 This analysis is called a 
“balancing of interests” approach.231 Besides considering the effects of the 
alleged act on U.S. foreign trade, as Judge Hand proposed in Alcoa, this 
approach also considers the interests of other countries in comparison with 
those of the U.S. in determining the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Sherman Act.   
The American Law Institute’s 1987 Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States reflects the consideration of foreign 
interests in the extraterritorial effect of laws as well. Section 403 provides 
that a state may not enact laws that have an unreasonable extraterritorial 
effect on persons or activities.232 The “unreasonableness” may relate the 
extent to which another state might have an interest in regulating the 
activity and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.233 
The Restatement also provides that 
[w]hen it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to 
exercise jurisdiction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions 
by the two states are in conflict, each state has an obligation to 
evaluate its own as well as the other state’s interest in exercising 
jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant factors. . . . [A] state should 
defer to the other state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.234  
Although the 1987 Restatement provides helpful guidance, this 
restatement is a secondary source of law, and it reflects the opinions of the 
American Law Institute, a private organization not affiliated with the U.S. 
government or any of its agencies.235 Specifically, the 1987 Restatement 
reflects the opinions of the American Law Institute in international law as 
it applies to the U.S. and domestic law impacting foreign relations.236 
Nevertheless, although it is “in no sense an official document of the United 
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States,”237 the 1987 Restatement has been cited by U.S. courts in a number 
of cases.238  
In F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A. in 2004, the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the application of the Sherman Act under the 
FTAIA’s exception because the Court ordinarily construes ambiguous 
statutes in a way that avoids unreasonable interference with other nations’ 
sovereign authority.239 In this case, the defendants had entered into a cartel 
in a foreign territory and caused damage to the plaintiff outside U.S. 
territory.240 The Court said that “Congress would not have intended the 
FTAIA’s exception to bring independently caused foreign injury within 
the Sherman Act's reach.”241 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas concurred 
in the judgment, asserting that “statutes should be read in accord with the 
customary deference to the application of foreign countries’ laws within 
their own territories.”242 Thus, the consideration of foreign country 
interests and international comity is a factor on which U.S. courts rely to 
limit the EACL.  
4. Consideration of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine 
When an act occurs in one country and has an effect on another 
country, a possibility exists that the party acted under the compulsion of 
the former country’s law or under the direction of that country’s authority. 
These acts should be distinguished from purely private conduct. 
Accordingly, U.S. courts have recognized sovereign immunity when 
determining jurisdiction over these acts, cognizant of the fact that claiming 
jurisdiction over such acts requires passing judgment on the sovereign acts 
of other states. This awareness is consistent with the doctrine of state 
immunity under customary international law and with the U.N. 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 
(“Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities”).243 In general, this doctrine 
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prevents courts from exercising jurisdiction over another state.244 Such 
disputes over jurisdiction can be disposed of only by the courts of the 
foreign state itself, by an international court or tribunal, or by diplomatic 
settlement.245 
Sovereign immunity was first recognized in the U.S. in 1812 in the 
U.S. Supreme Court case The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.246 Justice 
Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, asserting that “[i]t seems then 
to the Court, to be a principle of public law, that national ships of war, 
entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be 
considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its 
jurisdiction.”247 Similarly in Underhill v. Hernandez in 1897, Justice 
Fuller of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Second 
Circuit. Justice Fuller explained that “the acts of the defendant were the 
acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the 
subject of adjudication in the courts of another government.”248 Both 
courts agreed that “[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the 
independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country 
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done 
within its own territory.”249 
In antitrust law, because the Sherman Act’s prohibitions apply only to 
a “person” or a “corporation,” courts in the U.S. have asserted that the 
Act’s jurisdiction does not extend to the conduct of another state.250 
According to the District Court of Delaware in InterAmerican Refining 
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo in 1970, “[t]he Sherman Act does not confer 
jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. By its 
terms, it forbids only anticompetitive practices of persons and 
corporations.”251 The District Court for the Central District of California 
agreed with this point in International Association of Machinists v. 
OPEC.252 
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However, a state may not enjoy sovereign immunity when the alleged 
act is commercial in nature. Article 10 of the Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities provides a limit on invoking immunity if a state “engages in a 
commercial transaction with a foreign natural or juridical person” and 
“differences relating to the commercial transaction fall within the 
jurisdiction . . . of another State.”253 The same limit to sovereign immunity 
is provided for in the U.S. in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976 (“FSIA”). According to section 1605, a foreign state shall not be 
immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. or state courts when the “action is 
based [on] commercial activity carried on in the United States by [a] 
foreign state”; an action performed in the United States is connected to “a 
commercial activity of [a] foreign state elsewhere”; or an action outside 
the territory of the United States is connected to “a commercial activity of 
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 
States.”254 
According to the FSIA, the “foreign state” includes corporations that 
are agents or instrumentalities of a foreign state.255 Therefore, the action 
of a company under the direction or compulsion of a foreign state is 
regarded as that of the foreign state. Section 1603(d) defines “commercial 
activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular 
commercial transaction or act,” and adds that “[t]he commercial character 
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course 
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.”256 Commercial contracts or transactions will, therefore, 
generally be regarded as commercial activities and will not be protected 
by sovereign immunity. In Machinists,257 the court found that, using 
legislative intent, “commercial activity” includes activity within “‘a 
regular course of commercial conduct’ . . . the carrying on of a commercial 
enterprise such as a mineral extraction company, an airline, or a state 
trading corporation.”258 There is a difference between the Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunity and the FSIA, however. Article 2 of the 
Convention indicates that the law takes into account the purpose of a 
commercial transaction, while section 1603(d) of FSIA does not.259  
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Despite the fact that section 1603(d) of the FSIA suggests that 
“commercial activity” is much broader than the “commercial transaction” 
as used in the Convention of Jurisdictional Immunity, U.S. courts have 
found that “commercial activity” should be defined narrowly.260 In 
Machinists, the plaintiff commenced an action in the District Court for the 
Central District of California against the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) and its 13 member nations.261 The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants’ price-fixing activities violated the Sherman 
Act.262 Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the court’s jurisdiction was 
based on the FSIA.263 The 13 OPEC member nations chose not to make an 
appearance in the action.264  
Judge Hauk observed that under the theory of absolute sovereign 
immunity, a foreign state could not be sued without its consent.265 But 
under the restrictive theory, foreign states and sovereignties are not 
immune insofar as their commercial activities are concerned.266 In 
determining whether the activities of the OPEC members were 
governmental or commercial in nature, Judge Hauk examined both the 
FSIA and the standards recognized under international law and concluded 
that “the defendants’ control over their oil resources is an especially 
sovereign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue-
producing resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations’ peoples.”267 
Judge Hauk also considered the views of the state of California and the 
federal government concerning domestic crude oil activities and 
concluded that “there can be little question that establishing the terms and 
conditions for removal of natural resources from its territory, when done 
by a sovereign state, individually and separately, is a governmental 
activity.”268 The Central District Court of California then held that the 
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defendants’ activity was immune to the FSIA because it was not 
“commercial activity.”269 The court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction.270 
Limiting the protection of sovereign immunity to non-commercial 
activity might, however, result in some improper decisions. For example, 
a state may order producers in an industry to fix a minimum price for a 
product for the purpose of protecting employee rights. The export of the 
product to the U.S. could be considered a commercial activity. However, 
the producers have no way to resist the order of their home country’s 
authority—their behaviors are under the compulsion of a sovereign. The 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust law against the 
price-fixing cartel in such a case would, therefore, be improper.   
5. Exercise of Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the U.S.  
Unlike Canada, U.S. laws do not provide strict opposition to the 
exercise of foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction in the U.S. There is no 
statute that prevents the enforcement of foreign judgments or directions in 
the U.S., and there is no law, such as the Canadian Foreign Extraterritorial 
Measures Act, allowing a defendant to recover damages or penalties paid 
under a foreign court’s judgment.271 Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 allows U.S. 
district courts to assist foreign and international tribunals, and litigants 
before such tribunals. Section 1782 provides that a district court may order 
its resident “to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document 
or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international 
tribunal.”272 Section 1782 also states that a person in the U.S. is not 
prohibited from cooperating with foreign authority when such authority 
may exercise foreign jurisdiction in the U.S.273 Thus U.S. law does not 
preclude persons within the U.S. from voluntarily giving their testimony 
or producing a document to a foreign or international tribunal.274 However, 
the foreign authority in this section is limited to foreign countries with 
which the U.S. is at peace.275 
In sum, the U.S. exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in the area of 
antitrust law. The exercise of that jurisdiction includes both prescriptive 
and adjudicative jurisdiction. U.S. courts apply the effects doctrine to 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. The extraterritorial application of 
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antitrust law, however, is neither unlimited nor at the discretion of the 
courts. Federal statutes and court decisions have set out restrictions on the 
application of antitrust law to conduct in foreign territories. Namely, the 
alleged act must have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect on U.S. trade or commerce; the alleged person must have intended 
to affect U.S. trade or commerce; and the magnitude of the effect on U.S. 
foreign commerce must be sufficient relative to the effect on other 
nations.276 This limit also considers whether the alleged act is governed or 
remedied by foreign law. Finally, courts have refrained from exercising 
extraterritorial jurisdiction when the alleged act was conducted under the 
direction or compulsion of a foreign sovereign.   
C. The Japanese Approach 
Japan is a civil law jurisdiction in which laws arise primarily from 
statutes rather than judicial decisions.277 According to the Court Act of 
Japan, “[a] conclusion in a judgment of a higher instance court shall bind 
the lower instance courts with respect to the case concerned.”278 Therefore, 
the judgment of a higher court in a particular case is binding on lower 
courts, but is not binding in general.  
Japan’s main competition law, the Antimonopoly Act of Japan 
(“AMA”),279 does not state the scope of its extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
However, the extraterritorial application of the AMA has been discussed 
by the Japan Fair Trade Commission (“JFTC”). These decisions of the 
JFTC were previously treated as equivalent to judgments of the district 
court.280 
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The AMA was enacted in 1947, and the latest amendment was passed 
in 2013.281 The AMA has no provision that expressly states that the act 
covers conduct that takes place in a foreign territory, but jurisdiction over 
such conduct may be inferred from certain provisions. Article 2 defines 
private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade, and monopolistic 
situation as activities of an “enterprise.”282 Similarly, article 9 states that 
“[n]o company may be established that would cause an excessive 
concentration of economic power due to share holding . . . in other 
companies in Japan.”283 The words “enterprise” and “company” may be 
understood to limit the jurisdiction of the AMA to Japanese territory. 
However, these terms may be interpreted more broadly, which suggests 
that regardless of an enterprise’s or company’s nationality, the AMA 
governs its conduct as long as its activities have effects in Japan. 
In practice, the JFTC tends to interpret the words “enterprise” and 
“company” broadly. In MDS Nordion Inc. in 1998, the JFTC applied the 
AMA to a foreign company’s act that occurred mostly outside Japan.284 
MDS Nordion, a Canadian firm, was the largest manufacturer of 
Molybdenum-99 in the world and possessed a 100% share of the 
Molybdenum-99 market in Japan.285 MDS Nordion allegedly prevented its 
competitors from entering the Japanese market by entering into exclusive 
contracts, effective for ten years, with the two companies that were the 
sole purchasers of Molybdenum-99 in Japan.286 The JFTC observed that 
the word “‘firm’ is defined in the AMA as ‘a person who carries on a 
commercial, industrial, financial or any other business.’”287 It held that this 
definition did not exclude foreign firms.288 Therefore, although MDS 
Nordion was a Canadian firm that did not have an office in Japan, it was 
included in the definition of “firm” because it had entered into long-term 
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contracts with two Japanese companies and continuously shipped products 
to Japan.289 The JFTC ultimately held that MDS Nordion’s conduct was 
illegal under the AMA.290 
In Marine Hose in 2008, the JFTC applied the AMA to an 
international cartel, conducted abroad by foreign companies, which had 
anticompetitive effects in Japan.291 In this case, the JFTC launched an 
investigation in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice and the 
European Commission.292 These entities investigated one Japanese 
company, one British company, one French company, and two Italian 
companies.293 These companies had agreed to allocate consumers in the 
international market of specified Marine Hose between them.294 The JFTC 
issued a cease-and-desist order against the companies participating in the 
cartel, including those foreign companies located abroad.295 The 
companies subject to the cease-and-desist order were required to confirm 
that the illegal trade practices had terminated, and each company was 
required to conduct independent business operations that were free of 
illegal practices.296 Although the foreign companies were not imposed 
with any administrative fine, their practices were found to be illegal and 
they were subject to the cease-and-desist order.297 This case indicates that 
the JFTC will exercise jurisdiction over companies located abroad when 
the companies enter into a cartel and harm the Japanese market.  
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Cathode Ray Tubes for Television is the latest case in which the JFTC 
has applied the AMA extraterritorially.298 In 2009, the JFTC issued a 
cease-and-desist order and a surcharge payment order against an 
international cartel that fixed the price of Cathode Ray Tubes (“CRTs”) 
imported into Japan.299 Japanese CRT television manufacturers required 
their overseas manufacturing subsidiaries to enter into an agreement that 
set minimum target prices for specified CRTs.300 Although the 
manufacturers and their subsidiaries did not sell CRTs directly to 
customers in Japan, CRT television sets, which included a CRT, were sold 
to customers in Japan.301 The JFTC concluded that although the agreement 
was entered into outside of Japan, the AMA could be applied because 
competition inside Japan was substantially restrained.302 
Although the JFTC seemingly adopted an effects doctrine in applying 
the AMA to anticompetitive conduct engaged in outside Japan, the JFTC 
indicated no clear limit on the exercise of this jurisdiction. In MDS 
Nordion Inc. and Marine Hose, the violation had a direct and substantial 
restraint on competition in Japan because the violators were selling 
directly to consumers in Japan. In contrast, in CRT, the effect on 
competition in Japan was indirect.  
The MDS Nordion Inc., Marine Hose, and Cathode Ray Tubes cases 
illustrate that the JFTC is willing to apply the AMA to anticompetitive 
conduct that occurs in foreign territory but has effects in Japan. The 
absence of any Japanese statutes or higher court judgments opposing such 
an extraterritorial application of the AMA by the JFTC suggests that the 
Congress of Japan intended the AMA to be applied extraterritorially.  
In contrast to its willingness to apply the AMA to anticompetitive 
conduct abroad, the Japanese government does not recognize the exercise 
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of foreign competition law in Japan. On November 18, 1996, in United 
States of America v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., the government of 
Japan filed a brief in the U.S. Court of Appeal for the First Circuit in which 
it asserted that, following principles of international law, “anticompetitive 
activities occurring within Japanese territory by Japanese corporations fall 
primarily under the scope of Japanese jurisdiction and are regulated by 
Japanese legislation.”303 The Japanese government continued and stated 
that the application of U.S. antitrust law to such activities would be invalid 
“in the absence of a substantial link between the activities and the source 
of jurisdiction.”304 The Japanese government also wrote that “[o]ne 
Nation’s unilateral adjudication or extraterritorial application of its 
national laws is not, however, an appropriate means of resolving 
international differences.”305 The government of Japan then urged the 
court to hold that U.S. courts should not exercise jurisdiction over business 
activities conducted in Japan by Japanese companies.306 
The government of Japan made the same argument in 2004 in F. 
Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran S.A.307 In that case, the Japanese 
government submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioners to 
the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit.308 The 
government argued that the FTAIA sought to clarify the limits of U.S. 
antitrust jurisdiction in U.S. foreign commerce, not expand that 
jurisdiction.309 The brief cited the statement of U.S. Congress that “[t]he 
clarified reach of our own laws could encourage our trading partners to 
take more effective steps to protect competition in their markets under 
their competition laws.”310 The government of Japan asserted that nothing 
in the FTAIA’s legislative history suggests that it was intended to expand 
U.S. antitrust jurisdiction to foreign firms in foreign markets and if the 
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legislature had intended such an expansion, “there would have been a 
storm of criticism by foreign governments.”311  
In sum, Japan’s approach to the extraterritorial application of 
competition law is inconsistent. The JFTC has applied the AMA 
extraterritorially, apparently based on an effects doctrine, but it fails to 
provide a clear limit on the AMA’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The 
Japanese government, however, strongly opposes the extraterritorial 
application of foreign competition law to transactions conducted by 
Japanese corporations in Japan. These conflicting views indicate that Japan 
has a double standard when it comes to the EACL. Japan should provide a 
clearer analytical basis for determining the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
AMA, and one that consistently reflects the opinion of Japan toward the 
application of foreign jurisdiction competition law in Japan.  
D. The Vietnamese Approach 
In Vietnam, the National Assembly creates the law and only the 
Standing Committee of the National Assembly has the power to interpret 
the law when it is unclear.312 The Judge Council of the People’s Supreme 
Court has the power to provide guidelines unifying the application of law to 
adjudication.313 Therefore, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of competition 
law should be found in the Competition Law of Vietnam enacted by the 
National Assembly or in the interpretation of that law by the Standing 
Committee, and not in the decisions of the People’s Supreme Court. 
Article 2 of the Competition Law of Vietnam expressly states that this 
law shall apply to “[b]usiness organizations and individuals (hereinafter 
referred collectively to as enterprises), including also enterprises producing, 
supplying products, providing public-utility services, enterprises operating 
in the State-monopolized sectors and domains, and foreign enterprises 
operating in Vietnam.”314 However, the law does not define the word 
“operating” and the Standing Committee has not yet interpreted this term.  
There are two different ideas among the legal community on the 
meaning of “foreign enterprises operating in Vietnam” that are subject to 
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the Competition Law.315 The first is that the Competition Law can only 
govern acts conducted by foreign enterprises when two conditions are 
satisfied: first, the alleged act has taken place, or is taking place, in 
Vietnam; and second, the foreign enterprise must register its business in 
Vietnam as a foreign direct invested company, branch, or representative 
office.316 This opinion suggests that it is impossible for Vietnamese 
authorities to conduct an investigation or enforce a final judgement in a 
foreign territory. Moreover, the exercise of Vietnamese jurisdiction over 
acts conducted by a foreign enterprise abroad would violate international 
comity. 
Proponents of this first opinion argue that the Competition Law of 
Vietnam should state the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition 
Law more clearly, if law makers intended that the law have extraterritorial 
effects.317 This request for express language is supported by the express 
language in the Penal Code of Vietnam, enacted five years before the 
Competition Law. Article 6(2) of the Penal Code provides clearly that 
“[f]oreigners who commit offenses outside the territory of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam may be examined for penal liability according to the 
Penal Code of Vietnam in circumstances provided for in the international 
treaties, which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has signed or acceded 
to.”318 
The second opinion on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Competition Law of Vietnam is that the law should cover conduct by 
foreign enterprises abroad as long as such acts has effects on Vietnam.319 
Proponents of this opinion argue that the term “operating” is broad.320 It 
covers a wide range of activities, including commercial purposes. 
According to article 3(1) of the Commercial Law of Vietnam, 
“commercial activity” means “[an] activity for profit-making purposes, 
comprising purchase and sale of goods, provision of services, investment, 
commercial enhancement, and other activities for profit-making 
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purposes.”321 Therefore, any foreign firm doing any profit-making activity 
would be covered by the Competition Law, regardless of its registration in the 
territory where it is located. Article 3(3) of the Competition Law also defines 
“practices in restraint of competition” as “acts performed by enterprises to 
reduce, distort and prevent competition on the market, including agreements 
to restrict competition, abuse of a dominant position in the market, abuse of 
the monopoly position and economic concentration.”322 This definition does 
not limit acts restraining competition to acts engaged in within the territorial 
limits of Vietnam. 
These two opinions on extraterritorial jurisdiction are in conflict. 
Business registration in Vietnam is not necessary to determine the 
jurisdiction of the Competition Law because, on the one hand, according to 
article 4(9) of Law on Enterprise of Vietnam, a Vietnamese company is “any 
enterprise that is established or registered under Vietnam’s law and has its 
headquarter located in Vietnam.”323 A foreign direct-invested company in 
Vietnam, consequently, is a Vietnamese enterprise, not a foreign 
company. On the other hand, according to article 16 of the Commercial 
Law of Vietnam, “[f]oreign business entities shall be liable before the law 
of Vietnam for all operations of their representative offices and branches 
in Vietnam.”324 The conduct of a branch or a representative office of a 
foreign company is that of the foreign company and is, therefore, still 
regarded as conduct taken place in a foreign territory. The second opinion, 
therefore, contends that the phrase “operating in Vietnam” refers to the 
link between the alleged conduct of a foreign enterprise that takes place 
abroad and its effects on Vietnam. This opinion reflects the effects 
doctrine found in other jurisdictions. 
In the early days of the Vietnamese Competition Authority, there was 
a widely-shared view that the Competition Law of 2004 did not apply to 
conduct abroad.325 After nine years of growth, the VCA has become more 
capable of handling complicated cases, including offshore mergers.326 As 
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a result, the second opinion has become the most prevalent. The first case 
involving the extraterritorial application of the Competition Law of 
Vietnam was the Prudential and AIA Group Limited (“AIA”) acquisition 
case.327 In April 2010, the VCA received an application for consultation 
made by Prudential, based in the United Kingdom, and the American 
International Group Inc. (“AIG”), based in the U.S., concerning 
Prudential’s acquisition of AIA, a subsidiary of AIG.328 At the time of 
application, Prudential and AIA had subsidiaries in Vietnam.329 The 
combined market share of the subsidiaries in the life insurance market in 
Vietnam was 47%.330 The merger was not conducted in Vietnam and the 
participants were not Vietnamese companies.331 The merger would, 
however, substantially affect the Vietnamese life insurance market 
because the affiliates of the merging parties had a large market share in 
Vietnam.332 Despite the fact that the merger and merger participants were 
located abroad, Prudential and AIG worked with the VCA on the 
submission of their merger notification.333 The case was closed in June 
2010 because the participants chose not to proceed with the merger.334 
The second case involving the extraterritorial application of the 
Competition Law of Vietnam is the P3 case in 2014.335 P3 was an alliance 
of three large shipping companies, Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping 
Company, and CMA CGM—the head offices of each located outside of 
Vietnam.336 The participating companies sought to create a joint venture, 
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which would have operated the P3 Network.337 The participating firms 
submitted a merger notification to the VCA pursuant to article 20 of the 
Competition Law of Vietnam, as the operation of the proposed network 
would affect the Vietnamese container shipping market.338 This case was 
closed and the proposed network was abandoned when China’s Ministry 
of Commerce, a competition authority, refused to approve the merger.339  
Besides these two primary cases, there have been some offshore 
merger cases where the participating parties have consulted the VCA 
before concluding the mergers.340 These cases came to an end because the 
combined market share of the participating parties exceeded 50% of the 
relevant market, making them prohibited mergers under the Competition 
Law of Vietnam.341 This practice of merger control by the VCA suggests 
that the second viewpoint on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Competition Law of Vietnam has become the primary approach in 
Vietnam. The law therefore regulates not only conduct in Vietnam, but 
also conduct in a foreign territory that has an effect on the Vietnamese 
market.  
The effects doctrine in Vietnam, however, is not clearly defined, as 
there is neither an official guideline nor a judgment stating the limits of 
the extraterritorial jurisdiction. In reality, the practical exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in Vietnam is not as aggressive as that of other 
countries. The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction relies heavily on the 
compliance of MNCs. Moreover, there has been no case where foreign law 
has been enforced with respect to conduct in Vietnam. Thus, the degree of 
Vietnamese government opposition to such an exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is unclear. Vietnam should clarify the scope of the 
extraterritorial application of the Competition Law of Vietnam to provide 
clear guidelines for foreign companies doing business in Vietnam. Such 
limits should aim to reduce possible conflicts between Vietnam and 
foreign countries in cross-border competition cases.  
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E. Comparing the Approaches 
An analysis of international law indicates that the extraterritorial 
application of competition law by a state to conduct outside its territory is 
not contrary to international law if that extraterritorial application is 
properly limited. However, a state’s competition law should be applied 
extraterritorially only if countries fail to find a common solution for a 
cross-border competition issue. Before applying its competition law 
extraterritorially, a country should take into account the legislation, law 
enforcement, and national interest of other relevant countries. The 
effectiveness of this approach strongly depends on interstate 
communication given the different approaches to the EACL. 
Canada consistently relies on the territorial principle in applying its 
competition law. Although sections 109 and 110 of the Competition Act342 
provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction for merger control, Canada 
practically confines the enforcement of the Act to its territory. 
Additionally, Canada has enacted statutes that resist the enforcement of 
foreign competition law in Canada. In contrast, the U.S. vigorously 
exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction in the area of competition law. U.S. 
antitrust law is applied to any conduct that takes place abroad and that has a 
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. trade or 
commerce. Courts in the U.S. must, however, consider the interests of 
foreign countries, international comity, and the sovereign immunity doctrine 
when deciding whether to apply U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially. The 
U.S. also does not oppose the extraterritorial application of foreign 
competition law in its territory. The approach to the EACL in the U.S. is 
thus internally consistent. 
Japan, unlike the U.S., Canada, and Vietnam, is a country which has 
adopted a double standard toward the EACL. On the one hand, Japan applies 
its competition law, the AMA, to business transactions conducted in foreign 
territory that substantially restrain competition within Japanese territory. 
Japan arguably adopts the effects doctrine more aggressively than the 
United States does. Although the U.S. considers only direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effects, Japan considers acts conducted abroad that 
have indirect effects on the Japanese market. On the other hand, Japan 
strongly opposes the application of foreign competition law to conduct in 
Japanese territory. Unlike the U.S. and Canada, Japan employs an internally 
inconsistent approach to the EACL, which might cause conflict between 
countries in cross-border competition cases.   
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Finally, Vietnam is a developing country that has been enforcing 
competition law for only ten years. Although there are two contrasting 
opinions on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition Law of 
Vietnam,343 the practice of merger control indicates that Vietnam is 
shifting its approach to favor the extraterritorial principle when applying 
its competition law. The practical application of Vietnamese competition 
law to mergers conducted completely abroad by foreign companies 
suggests that the effects doctrine is not simply the privilege of a powerful 
country, but a doctrine that a small, developing country can effectively 
employ. Like the U.S., Vietnam does not oppose the application of foreign 
competition law to conduct that takes place in Vietnam.    
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
This comparative study of the EACL highlights the disjointed 
approaches to extraterritorial jurisdiction. To facilitate both international 
and intra-national business transactions, countries should adopt a clearer 
model for the extraterritorial application of their competition law—one that 
allows countries to protect their markets while encouraging cooperation 
among all countries involved. This model should apply not only externally, 
to the extraterritorial application of a country’s competition law, but also 
internally, to the exercise of foreign competition law to conduct in its own 
territory. This would eliminate the EACL double standard of some countries 
that extend the reach of their competition law to foreign territories but reject 
the application of foreign law to conduct in their own territory.  
Thus this Article proposes a series of pertinent questions that a country 
should consider when determining the extraterritorial jurisdiction of its 
competition law and the application of another country’s competition law in 
its territory. The first set of questions focuses on the conduct that occurred. 
First, did the person or entity conducting the business transaction intend to 
violate an obligation set by the country of forum? Second, how did, or how 
will, the transaction harm the country of forum? Third, did the person or 
entity engage in the transaction pursuant to the direction or compulsion of 
the home country? 
Similar to the effects test in Alcoa, the first two questions are necessary 
to analyze the link between the transaction in question and the country that 
wishes to apply its law extraterritorially. In a competition case, the intent 
and the effects are closely related. Countries should not exercise jurisdiction 
over conduct abroad when the person or entity had no intent to violate the 
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law of the country of forum, or if the conduct had no effect on the country 
of forum. The third question considers the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
ensuring that a country does not overreach its jurisdiction and apply it to the 
actions of another sovereign.   
The second set of questions relevant to the inquiry of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction relates to the procedure in the home country. First, does the 
home country have a similar law? Second, did the country where the 
business transaction occurred take any legal measure to control or sanction 
the transaction? Third, did the sanction or measure take into account the 
interest of the country of forum? Finally, did the home country try to 
cooperate with the country of forum when deciding the case? These 
questions analyze whether the country where the transaction takes place 
seeks to prevent such harmful conduct and whether the countries are 
sufficiently cooperating and considering the interest of the country of forum. 
The final set of questions relates to the procedure in the country of 
forum. First, did the country of forum attempt to cooperate with the home 
country before proceeding in the case? Second, does the country of forum 
give the person or entity involved in the transaction the opportunity to 
participate in the judgment? And finally, does the country of forum take into 
account the interests of the home country? Like the second set of questions, 
these questions seek to encourage cooperation among the countries before 
taking any action unilaterally. Additionally, this set of questions ensures that 
the country of forum applies its competition law extraterritorially with 
transparency and using due process. Each set of questions considers key 
elements of extraterritorial jurisdiction, as currently applied by various 
countries, and ensures that the highest level of cooperation and effectiveness 
is met when exercising the extraterritorial application of competition law.  
CONCLUSION 
By analyzing the key attributes of the EACL and the practical 
approaches of different countries, this Article proposes the proper approach 
to the EACL that every country should adopt. This approach contains a 
series of pertinent questions that a country should consider when faced with 
an issue of EACL. This approach relies on the effects doctrine rather than 
other exceptions to the territorial principle. This approach also takes into 
account sovereign immunity as directed by international law. The exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction does not violate international law when the 
exercise is confined to the effects within a country’s territory and when the 
exercise is necessary to protect a country’s interests.  

